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Abstract 
 
European countries are economically dependent upon each other. This paper therefore 
embeds the analysis of the Western Balkan countries within a wider perspective of the 
European economy as a whole. It combines a simple Core-Periphery model with an under-
consumption model to provide a convincing explanation of the emergence of secular 
stagnation, the dependency relationships between the European economies, and the spillover 
effects of Eurozone crisis to the Western Balkans. Due to tendencies to under-consumption, 
the Core countries have been vulnerable to secular stagnation and in order to overcome this 
tendency within the Eurozone they are dependent on export revenues from the peripheries to 
sustain their economic growth. This has led to high trade and current account deficits during 
the boom and placed the peripheries in a highly vulnerable position during the recession 
period.  Financialisation of the European economy has emerged as a response to the tendency 
towards secular stagnation, as the provision of consumer credit has stimulated demand and 
temporarily overcome under-consumption tendencies. The paper argues that continuing 
austerity as a method to create internal devaluation is unlikely to succeed as a means to 
extricate the periphery countries from the crisis. Given the dependencies of the European 
economies upon one another, a possibly better way out of the current period of low growth 
and stagnation would be a coordinated fiscal expansion to stimulate domestic and Europe-
wide demand. 
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Interdependence between Core and 
Peripheries of the European Economy: 
Secular Stagnation and Growth in the 
Western Balkans  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Eurozone crisis can be understood as the outcome of a structural 
imbalance between “Core” and “Periphery” countries (Lapavitsas et al., 2010). 
Germany is at the centre of “Core” group of countries in the Eurozone, while 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are conventionally seen as forming the 
“Periphery”. Yet other EU member states outside the Eurozone also belong to 
the European Periphery. Countries of the “Outer Periphery” such as Bulgaria 
and Romania are just as much affected by the Eurozone crisis as the “Inner 
Periphery” countries, even though they have not adopted the Euro. The 
fortunes of their economies are affected by developments in the Eurozone, not 
just through flows of trade, investment and people, but also because the 
financial sectors are highly integrated.   
 
Outside the EU, there is a further layer of countries that are neither Eurozone 
members nor EU members but which are similarly influenced by 
developments in the EU and the Eurozone. Following Martin Sokol, these 
countries can be referred to as the “Super Periphery” of the EU (Martin Sokol, 
2001). They comprise the countries of the Western Balkans and of the 
European Eastern Neighbourhood.  
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A feature of these countries, especially in the Western Balkans, has been 
widespread euroisation both among households and companies. This has 
meant the Western Balkan countries have not been able to use devaluation as a 
means to improve the competitiveness of their economies. A high proportion 
of loans and savings are denominated in Euros, which inhibits the use of 
devaluation or depreciation of the currency as an instrument of macro-
economic policy to improve the external competitiveness of their economies. 
At the same time, EU bailouts are unavailable to these countries. Therefore, the 
only option is internal devaluation, which requires decreased levels of prices 
and unit labour costs to bring about improved external competitiveness.  
 
In this paper we identify the extent to which these peripheral countries are 
connected to and influenced by the evolution of the EU economy as a whole, 
and how they have been consequently affected by the crisis in the Eurozone. 
 
 
2. Under-Consumption in the Capitalist Core 
 
The Classical economists were preoccupied with the question whether there 
would be enough aggregate demand to buy all the goods and services 
produced by business enterprises. The theme was taken up by Keynes who 
argued that market economies were prone to a lack of effective demand and to 
the possibility of unemployment equilibrium (Keynes, 1936). The under-
consumption theorists further more proposed that market economies were also 
prone to “secular stagnation” (Hansen, 1955; Summers, 2013). Radical 
economists took this further, most notably in the work of Paul Baran and Paul 
Sweezy who argued that under “monopoly capitalism”, employers strive to 
increase profits by pushing down wages, which reduces aggregate 
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consumption (Baran and Sweezy, 1966). In a further development of the 
theory, they argued that the financial sector dominance has emerged as a 
means to maintain aggregate consumption. However, this has the unfortunate 
side effect of increasing instability in the economy (Minsky, 1986). The 
financialisation thesis suggests that financialisation generates instability and is 
a prime factor in economic stagnation, and would lead to debt-deflation and 
prolonged recession (Palley, 2007). Others have argued that stagnation is more 
deep-seated phenomenon and that it is the tendency towards stagnation that 
generates financialisation rather than the other way round, and with the failure 
of financialisation the underlying tendency towards stagnation reappears 
(Bellamy Foster and Magdoff, 2009). Moreover, financialisation has also 
generated gross inequality (Picketty, 2014), which further reduces 
consumption demand and reinforces the under-consumption problem. 
 
Governments of advanced countries have several options for escaping from 
the under-consumption trap (Baran and Sweezy, 1966). First they can increase 
government spending in various forms. Social spending (pensions, social 
security) can be increased but the limits of this appear when social spending 
begins to undermine work incentives. The public services such as education 
and health can be expanded through public expenditure, but the limits of this 
are reached under continuous pressure to introduce private provision of 
services. A strong contender for generating additional demand is through 
military expenditure (in 2013 the US military budget was $640 billion). 
However, this also reaches its limits for countries that wish to pursue a 
peaceful non-aggressive foreign policy. Another way to generate increased 
demand in economies that suffer from under-consumption is to increase 
consumption through advertising and marketing expenditure. However, this 
also has its limits due to the finite needs of the population, although constant 
efforts are made to stimulate artificial desires.  
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A further important mechanism to stimulate demand is to rely upon demand 
from other countries and to promote exports through measures that build a 
country’s competitive advantage. This form of export led growth is usually 
accompanied by central control over wage costs, combined with labour market 
reforms to reduce wage costs and promote the flexibility of the labour force. 
Many other measures are available to promote exports. Some countries are 
more successful than others. However, the limit of this approach is that all 
countries cannot do this at the same time. Some must be net importers if others 
are to be net exporters. This has been a central feature of the Eurozone 
arrangement. The Core countries, especially Germany, have become net 
exporters and rely upon demand from the Periphery counties to compensate 
for under-consumption on the domestic market.  
 
Finally, additional demand can be generated through the development of 
consumer credit. If the workers do not have enough buying power from their 
wages, then they can be encouraged to take out consumer credit to fill the gap. 
This has led to the development of a very sophisticated market in consumer 
finance and to the general ‘financialisation’ of the advanced economies that 
generates additional consumption through growth of consumer credit. But 
financialisation generates asset bubbles and financial crises and so also has its 
eventual limits. 
 
 
3. Secular Stagnation in the Eurozone 
 
The Euro was established in January 2002 as a monetary union without a fiscal 
union. Under this arrangement, the nominal interest rate set by the ECB is the 
same across all the member states. Since this common interest rate that is too 
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high in some countries and too low in others, immense structural imbalances 
have grown over time. In particular, as Germany is a strong exporter, she has 
run structural current account surpluses, while the peripheral countries such 
as Greece, Spain, and Italy have run structural current account deficits. These 
deficits have led to a build up of debt in the peripheral countries that has 
contributed to the economic crisis that has beset the Eurozone since 2009.  
 
In addition, the adoption of the Euro induced investors to believe that the 
debts contracted by the peripheral countries were just as credit-worthy as the 
debts incurred by the Core countries such as Germany or the Netherlands. This 
led to a great inflow of foreign capital into the Periphery countries and enabled 
them to sustain either an unjustified high level of wages and consumer 
spending as in the case of Greece, or a high level of asset price appreciation 
and housing boom as in the case of Spain.  
 
In autumn 2009, following the election of the Pasok government, it was 
revealed that the Greek state had a far higher level of debt than had previously 
been thought. Investors suddenly realised that the Periphery countries could 
not necessarily pay back their debts, and that more importantly, there was no 
guarantee that the Core countries would bail out their debts within the single 
currency system (Pisani-Ferry, 2014). Panic ensued. The value of the 
government bonds in the Periphery countries fell, and yields rose to 
unsustainable levels. Since then, the Eurozone has been involved in a vivid fire 
fighting exercise to restore calm. The Periphery countries have been reluctantly 
bailed out though individual rescue schemes, culminating in the creation of the 
European Stability Mechanism, and the creation of a system of New Economic 
Governance, which has brought the fiscal policies of the individual Eurozone 
member states under the supervision, if not outright control, of the central 
authorities at the European Commission and the ECB. In addition, intra-
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eurozone imbalances have been financed by the TARGET inter-bank 
settlement system adopted between the Eurozone central banks (Werner-Sinn, 
2014). 
 
Since the debts that governments issued were largely held by their own banks 
in the Periphery countries, the banks also got into difficulties. As the value of 
the government bonds that they held fell, and they ran into danger of 
bankruptcy, and the banks had to be bailed out by their own governments 
leading to a further increase in government deficits. This negative spiral of 
debt and collapse between the states and the banks became a bottleneck, 
preventing the resumption of economic growth (Pisany-Ferry, 2014).  
 
The essence of the problem was that the Eurozone lacked an EU-wide “bank 
resolution” mechanism. When banks get into difficulties in normal countries, 
their own central banks have the ability to step in and bail them out (or 
recapitalise them) if needed, and can subject such banks to reorganisations and 
other regulatory procedures, or close them down. In the Eurozone there was 
no single authority that had the power to step in and close down a bank in 
difficulty, or bail them out, relieving the bank’s own state of the responsibility. 
Eventually, policy makers realised the need for a banking union to accompany 
the monetary union that would create a single authority to carry out these 
responsibilities. These institutions have now been established, as the European 
Banking Authority based in London and the increased power to the ECB to act 
as a banking supervisor with powers to “resolve” local banks in trouble in 
Eurozone member states.   
 
The policies that have been adopted to restore balance in the Eurozone have 
been generalised austerity and cut backs in state spending, combined with 
increases in taxation. A stability treaty was signed to restrict the government 
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deficits of the Eurozone member states to 3% of their GDP. In order to achieve 
these targets public expenditure has been cut, further deepening recession and 
stagnation in the Eurozone. In order to restore the competitiveness of the 
economies of the Periphery, internal devaluations have been imposed in an 
effort to reduce real wages and prices of exported goods.  
 
The Core countries have suffered from secular stagnation as their economies 
have matured and the autonomous part of their growth has diminished. Their 
economic growth has been propelled by exports to the rest of the EU leading to 
structural imbalances within the Eurozone with a trade surplus in Germany 
and the Core countries, as the countries in the Periphery and super-Periphery 
are consumers of Core country exports. This process generates trade deficits in 
the Periphery that have been financed by borrowing from the banking sector in 
the Core countries largely though government bonds. This is an unsustainable 
equilibrium as debts in Periphery grow ever higher and eventually cannot be 
financed. The Periphery cannot export its way out of debt through 
devaluation, due to the euro monetary system. The only alternatives are (a) 
bailouts or (b) internal devaluation (cutting unit labour costs and government 
expenditure (i.e. austerity programmes). But austerity leads to a further drop 
in aggregate domestic demand and prolongation of the recession. 
 
 
4. Financialisation of the Super Periphery 
 
The Super Periphery countries experienced a period of strong economic 
growth in the 2000s. The period between the ‘democratic turn’ in Croatia and 
Serbia in 2000 and the start of the economic crisis in the region in 2009 was one 
of expansion. A credit boom supported rapid growth as foreign banks poured 
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new funds into the region. This led to a huge increase in imports mainly of 
consumer durables such as motor cars, much needed to replace the antiquated 
stock of vehicles, but also other consumer goods, and to a lesser extent 
machine tools and other equipment to upgrade the industrial production 
sector. The Western Balkan countries ran large trade and current account 
deficits. By 2008, the trade deficit in the Western Balkans was running at an 
average rate of 35% of GDP. This also led to an increase of international debt, 
although this was not excessive and during this period was rather stable at 
around 50% GDP (between 2003-2008). 
 
A rapid takeover of domestic banking system by foreign (mainly EU) banks 
took place between 2000 and 2005, heralding a rapid financialisation of the 
region.  
 
Figure 1: Bank assets under foreign ownership, Western Balkans, 1998-2011 (%)  
Source: EBRD Banking Survey online data.  
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The strong inflow of foreign capital led to falling interest rates and rapid credit 
growth. Since the onset of the crisis, Eurozone banks have tried to build up 
their domestic capital and are “deleveraging” from the Western Balkans. 
Through the Vienna Agreement, the IFIs provide €24.5bn loans to 17 parent 
banks of banks in Central and South East Europe. Later, the “Vienna Plus” 
agreement aimed to encourage substitution of foreign borrowing by local 
currency borrowing and more efficient absorption of EU structural funds. 
 
 
5. Eurozone Crisis and the Peripheries of Europe 
 
The Inner Periphery of the Eurozone has experienced a dramatic economic 
recession that has been widely commented and analysed (Cristodoulakis et al. 
2011). The Outer Periphery has also suffered from the spillover effects of the 
Eurozone crisis (Beleva, 2011). 
 
The Western Balkan countries were severely hit by the global financial crisis 
and subsequently by the Eurozone crisis after 2008 experiencing a double-dip 
recession and virtual stagnation (Bartlett and Prica, 2013). Initially there was a 
very strong reduction in export demand, though this picked up in 2013. There 
was also a remarkable collapse in credit growth, a reduction in FDI inflows 
and a fall in remittance inflows. The fall in demand for the output of 
companies due to the recession, and to governments’ tactics of delaying 
payments in order to meet budget deficit targets, has caused companies 
difficulties paying back the loans they took out during the boom period. This 
in turn has led to a huge increase in non-performing loans. Furthermore, 
foreign banks have pulled funds out of region through a process of 
deleveraging. The outcome of these spillovers from the Eurozone crisis has 
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been a double dip recession in 2009 and 2012. The average rate of growth in the 
Western Balkan countries has fallen from a pre-crisis average of around 5% 
p.a. in 2003-07, to an average of around 1% p.a. in 2009-12. At the same time 
unemployment has risen to dramatically high levels – in some countries such 
as Bosnia and Herzegovina to levels exceeding those in Greece. Bulgaria and 
Romania – countries in the Outer Periphery – have not suffered such dire 
consequences as unemployment levels have remained nearer to the EU 
average of 10%  (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Unemployment rates in South East Europe and the EU-27 in 2013 
 
Source: Eurostat online data on unemployment rate for 15-74 year olds, data codes 
[lfsq_urgan] and [cpc_siemp] 
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6. Growth Dependency between Core and Periphery 
 
The Core-Periphery model, combined with the theory of Under-Consumption, 
suggests that the growth in the Core is dependent on the growth in the 
Periphery, and vice versa. Without the demand for exports from the Periphery, 
the Core would be subjected to secular stagnation. Without financial transfers 
from the Core, the Periphery would be subject to unsustainable balance of 
payments crises.  
 
This section develops a modelling approach to identify the relationship 
between the Core and the Periphery and to investigate the extent to which the 
Core, Periphery and Super Periphery are dependent on each other. 
 
The model is set out as follows. The growth of country i at time t depends on 
an autonomous component β0, and also depends on the growth of the EU as a 
whole GrowthEU27t at time t. The extent of the dependency is represented by 
coefficient β1. There is a dummy variable that captures the effect of the 
Eurozone crisis of country i at time t, which takes the value 1 for the years 
2009-2013, and 0 otherwise, with coefficient β2. The model is set out in equation 
1: 
 
Git = β0 + β1 * GrowthEUt + β2 * Crisisit + uit           (1) 
 
Where  
¾ β0 represents autonomous growth capacity  
¾ β1 represents dependency on EU growth  
¾ β2 represents the effect of the crisis on autonomous growth  
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The data used to analyse the model is taken from EUROSTAT. Available data 
on annual real GDP growth rates for the EU countries and the enlargement 
countries span the years from 1996-2014 (N=19). While this is a small sample, it 
is nevertheless a consistent dataset.  We divide countries into five groups:  
 
Country group Countries Core countries within the Eurozone and the EU (Inner Core) Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands Core countries outside the Eurozone, within the EU (Outer Core) Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom Periphery countries within the Eurozone and the EU (Inner Periphery) Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain Periphery countries outside the Eurozone, within the EU (Outer Periphery) Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania Periphery countries, outside the Eurozone and the EU but with currencies tied to the Euro (Super Periphery) Albania, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Serbia 
 
Table 1 shows the estimates for a set of European countries including those in 
the Core, Periphery and super Periphery of the Eurozone. The dependent 
variable is the real GDP growth rate of the country in question. The 
independent variables are the growth rate of the EU27 calculated without the 
country in question based on chain linked volume indices of GDP obtained 
from Eurostat (hence “EU27-1”), and a crisis dummy where D=0 for all years 
prior to 2009 and D=1 thereafter. 
 
Table 1: Core countries dependency on EU27-1 
Country β0 β1 β2 Breusch-Pagan (sig.) Adjusted R-squared Finland -0.23 1.68*** -0.60 0.20 0.944 Germany -2.08*** 1.40*** 3.15*** 0.05 0.771 Austria 0.35 0.90*** 0.16 0.82 0.858 Netherlands 0.73 0.88*** -1.01 0.26 0.775 France 0.21 0.80*** 0.26 0.60 0.871 Belgium 0.48 0.77*** 0.08 0.18 0.816 
Mean -0.09 1.07 0.34   
Note: *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% 
significance level. The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity with Ho=constant variance. 
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The results reported in Table 1 reveal that the Inner Core countries are subject 
to a tendency towards under-consumption as the coefficients on the constant 
term, which represents autonomous growth, are negative or insignificantly 
different from zero. In contrast, the coefficients on the variable β1, which 
represents the dependency on EU growth, are positive and highly significant. 
For Finland and Germany the coefficients are greater than 1, which indicates 
that for each percentage point increase in the EU growth rate, their growth rate 
increases by more than a percentage point. Therefore, their gain from EU 
growth through exports, and in other ways, has offset the tendency towards 
secular stagnation to which their economies are prone. The Core is indeed 
dependent on the Periphery.  
 
The coefficients on the crisis dummy are on the whole positive although only 
statistically significant for Germany, which shows that the Core countries have 
not been significantly affected by the crisis, or have even benefitted from it (for 
example through domestic stimulus measures).  
 
Only one of the regressions (Germany) shows signs of autocorrelation (the 
Breusch-Pagan test is significant at the 10% level), which could introduce 
difficulties in interpreting the t-statistics. 
 
Table 2 shows the results for the Inner Periphery group of countries. Here, 
autonomous growth potential is mainly positive with the exception of Italy as 
indicated by the positive values of the constant term, most of which are highly 
significant (with the exception of Ireland and Portugal).  
 
Growth dependency, indicated by coefficient β1 is also positive, except in the 
case of Greece, and in several countries greater than 1 (Ireland, Italy and 
Slovenia). Unlike the Core countries, the negative coefficients on β1, the crisis 
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dummy, are uniformly negative, and not surprisingly extremely high in the 
case of Greece.  
 
Table 2: Inner Periphery dependency on EU27-1 
Country β0 β1 β2 Breusch-Pagan (sig.) Adjusted R-squared Greece 3.41*** 0.08 -8.15*** 0.21 0.722 Italy -1.37*** 1.07*** -0.09 0.68 0.919 Portugal 0.45 0.76*** -1.68 0.80 0.594 Slovenia 1.25** 1.27*** -2.33*** 0.74 0.863 Spain 2.06*** 0.67*** -3.09*** 0.14 0.910 Ireland 2.42* 1.62*** -2.35 0.68 0.641 Cyprus 2.61*** 0.54** -4.30*** 0.04 0.787 
Mean 1.55 0.86 -3.14   
Note: *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% 
significance level. The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity with Ho=constant variance. 
Results are sorted by column β1 
 
Autocorrelation appears as a problem in the regressions for Cyprus (Breusch-
Pagan test significant at 5% level) suggesting that the standard errors for these 
may be over-estimated. 
 
Table 3: Outer Core: dependency on EU27-1 
Country β0 β1 β2 Breusch-Pagan (sig.) Adjusted R-squared Estonia -0.55 2.92*** 1.49 0.90 0.609 Latvia 1.45 2.17*** -1.40 0.63 0.492 Lithuania 1.54 2.04*** -0.89 0.77 0.478 Sweden -0.61 1.53*** 1.87*** 0.34 0.880 Denmark -0.59 1.08*** 0.27 0.21 0.836 Slovakia 3.04** 0.91* -1.69 0.19 0.367 Czech 1.25 0.90*** -1.20 0.16 0.452 UK 1.05** 0.74*** -1.13* 0.11 0.734 Poland 3.61*** -0.41* -0.54 0.51 0.227 
Mean 1.13 1.32 -0.36   
Note: *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% 
significance level. The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity with Ho=constant variance. 
Results are sorted by column b(1) 
 
Table 3 shows the results for the countries of the Outer Core, i.e. the countries 
not in the eurozone but within the EU core group. Two regressions for this 
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group indicate very strong autonomous growth potentials: Poland and 
Slovakia. The dependency of Outer Core countries on the EU growth is 
positive, and very strong in the cases of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden. 
The coefficient even exceeds a value of 2 for the Baltic countries.  
 
Table 4: Outer Periphery: dependency on EU 
Country β0 β1 β2 Breusch-Pagan (sig.) Adjusted R-squared Hungary 0.64 1.08*** -0.60 0.94 0.588 Bulgaria 2.38 0.61 -2.19 0.21 0.190 Romania 3.05 0.38 -3.02 0.55 0.103 
Mean 2.02 0.69 -1.94   
Note: *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% 
significance level. The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity with Ho=constant variance. 
Results are sorted by column β1 
 
 
Among the outer periphery group, the two SEE countries, Bulgaria and 
Romania, show strong autonomous growth potential (high coefficients on β0) 
whereas in relation to growth dependency the values of the β1 coefficient are 
less than 1, suggesting a weak dependency and a lesser gain from EU 
economic relations than for the other countries in the group. Both countries 
have experienced a severe adverse impact of the eurozone crisis. 
 
Table 5: Super-Periphery countries dependency on EU27-1  
Country β0 β1 β2 Breusch-Pagan (sig.) Adjusted R-squared Croatia 2.38** 0.67* -4.48*** 0.53 0.681 Macedonia 1.56 0.61 -0.27 0.31 0.122 Serbia 3.74 0.20 -3.96 0.13 0.088 Albania 5.73** 0.00 -3.62 0.13 0.022 
Mean 3.36 0.37 -3.08   
Note: *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% 
significance level. Critical lower bound of Durbin-Watson statistic (DWL) = 0.95. Results are 
sorted by column b(1) 
 
Table 5 shows results for the Super Periphery group of countries. Most 
regressions for this group indicate very strong autonomous growth potentials 
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with the coefficients of the constant term having a high level of statistical 
significance in the cases of Albania and Croatia. This implies that even in the 
absence of EU membership the countries could achieve a high rate of economic 
growth under the rights conditions. There is clearly a large potential for catch-
up growth in this group.  
 
The dependency of Super Periphery countries on the EU growth is weak, with 
only no countries having a coefficient on β1 greater than unity. Only Croatia 
has a statistically significant positive coefficient. The low coefficients on β1 
suggest that the Super Periphery is not dependent on the Core. Hence, catch-
up growth in the Super Periphery could be “autonomous” and could feasibly 
be generated by internal demand and exports to other countries within the 
region and elsewhere in the world. 
 
The crisis effects in the super-periphery are uniformly negative and large with 
the exception of Macedonia, as shown by the coefficients on β2. Interestingly, 
Macedonia is the only country in the region where unemployment rates have 
fallen during the crisis, in part due to successful macroeconomic policies and 
to a successful attempt to attract foreign investors into low-tax industrial and 
technology zones. The DW statistic is above the lower bound for all countries 
in this group.    
 
Table 5: Use of robust standard errors to resolve autocorrelation 
 β0 β1 β2 F(2,16) Cyprus 2.61*** 0.54* -4.30*** 19.59 Germany -2.08** 1.40*** 3.15*** 21.97 
Note: *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% 
significance level.  
 
To deal with the problem of possible autocorrelation in Cyprus and Germany, 
the relevant regressions were re-estimated using the robust standard errors 
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procedure within STATA. The results are presented in Table 5. Here, as above, 
β1 is the coefficient on current growth rate in the EU, β2 is the coefficient on the 
crisis dummy variable. While the values of the coefficients remain the same the 
significance level of the estimates is improved. However, this has made little 
difference in practice, with only a reduction in the significance level for β1 for 
Cyprus from 5% to 10% level. 
 
Table 6: Mean values of coefficients by country group 
Country Group Mean β0 Mean β1 Mean β2 Mean β0+ Mean β2 Inner Core -0.09 1.07 0.34 0.25 Outer Core 1.13 1.32 -0.36 0.77 Inner Periphery 1.26 0.89 -2.80 -1.54 Outer Periphery 2.02 0.69 -1.94 0.08 Super Periphery 3.36 0.37 -3.08 0.27 
Source: Table 2-5 above 
 
Table 6 summarises the results of the analysis by country group, which shows 
average values of the estimated coefficients for each group of countries. It can 
be seen that the autonomous growth coefficient β0 differs by country group, 
being negative for the Inner Core countries. This indicates that the Inner Core 
countries may be suffering from secular stagnation and under-consumption 
that is relieved by the export demand coming from the Inner, Outer and Super 
Peripheries. The mean value of this coefficient is progressively higher for the 
Inner Periphery, followed by the Outer Periphery and then the Super 
Periphery where it reaches a value of 3.3. This indicates that the more 
peripheral a country is to the Eurozone, the greater is the autonomous growth 
component, and the greater potential for catching up. The data is presented in 
Figure 3, showing clearly the differences between the country groups. 
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Figure 3: Parameter values for country groups (see Table 6) 
 
 
The average of the coefficient β1, which reflects the degree to which individual 
country growth rates are dependent upon the growth rate of the EU, also 
differs between groups of countries. The Core countries (both Inner and Outer) 
have a mean value of this coefficient that is greater than unity. This implies 
that for each 1 percentage point increase in EU growth, the Core countries 
experience a more than 1 percentage point increase in their own growth rate 
(on average). The implication is that the Core countries benefit more than 
proportionately from EU growth, and this offsets to some extent at least their 
propensity to negative or low autonomous growth. The Inner, Outer and 
Super Peripheries have relatively low coefficients of dependency on the EU. 
The mean value of this coefficient is less than 1 for each group, and becomes 
progressively lower as one moves from the inner Periphery to the Super 
Periphery. This implies that each 1% growth of the EU has a less than 1% 
impact on growth in countries within the Periphery.  
 
Turning to the crisis effects, the greatest effect is seen in the Inner Periphery 
and the Super Periphery, with the greatest impact in the latter countries. The 
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Outer Periphery has been affected by the crisis but to a slightly lesser extent. 
The Core group of countries have actually gained from the crisis in terms of 
growth effects, compared to the non-crisis years. This may be due to the fact 
that they have not had to endure austerity policies, and to the stimulus policies 
that were applied initially in the Core group. 
 
The final column in Table 6 presents the net effect of the crisis, combining both 
autonomous growth and the crisis impact together. This shows that the crisis 
had the perverse effect in the Inner Core countries of offsetting the negative 
autonomous growth and producing a small positive growth effect. The two 
effects balanced each other out almost completely in the Outer Periphery. The 
greatest net effect was in the Inner Periphery, while in the Super Periphery the 
net effect was negative but at a lower level 
 
 
7. Austerity policies 
 
In the Inner, Outer and Super Periphery countries, austerity programmes 
accompanied by structural reforms have involved a variety of measures. These 
have included cuts to public expenditure (education, health services, pensions, 
public employment) and labour market reforms to drive down unit labour 
costs. By 2014, only the UK and France had lower levels of severance pay in 
case of redundancy than the Western Balkan countries. In the Super Periphery, 
substantial labour market reforms and cuts to pensions have recently been 
implemented in Serbia. Two countries seek to reform pensions though 
reductions in entitlements (BiH, Serbia). Most countries have tried to meet 
ambitious targets for public sector deficits (BiH and Macedonia down to 2% of 
GDP). Cuts have been introduced in public sector employment and public 
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sector wages. Tax reforms have been introduced in the form of flat taxes that 
are now in place in several countries in the Super Periphery (Macedonia, 
Albania).  
 
While the countries of the Inner Periphery within the Eurozone have been 
supported by EU bailout funds, the IMF has supported the countries of the 
Outer Periphery and the Super Periphery through stand-by arrangements and 
other measures. In 2009 the IMF agreed Stand-By Arrangements with Romania 
(€3.5bn Romania), Bosnia and Herzegovina (€1.1bn), and with Serbia 
(€402.5m).  The IMF arrangements have involved strict conditionality in 
relation to fiscal consolidation and economic reform measures. For example, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been under a US$405m stand-by arrangement 
with IMF since 2012 that has mandated a tight austerity package designed to 
reduce the budget deficit, which was cut to 4.5% of GDP in 2010, 2.5% in 2012 
and 2% in 2013. This was achieved through cuts to rights-based pensions, 
public sector wages. Serbia agreed an IMF stand by arrangement 2009 $1.5bn, 
which lasted until 2011. It mandated nominal freeze in public pay and 
pensions. Subsequently the deficit increased 7% in 2013. Emergency measures 
to reduce the deficit in 2014 have involved a 10% cut to public sector pay and 
employment and elimination of subsidies to 153 state owned firms employing 
60,000. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was the recipient of a 
precautionary programme from the IMF. She has maintained a low budget 
deficit at 2.5% of GDP in 2010 and 2011 achieved through a two-year public 
sector pay freeze. The deficit increased again to 4.1% of GDP in 2013 and more 
in 2014. 
 
However, fiscal consolidation associated with these austerity policies is likely 
to reduce domestic demand and undermine growth, offsetting many of the 
benefits of increased competitiveness. 
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Despite the rhetoric of austerity and structural reform, the Core countries have 
practiced the opposite. Germany comes 28th out of 34 countries ranked by 
OECD for reform progress since onset of crisis. In early stage of crisis, an anti-
crisis measure to subsidise new car purchases was adopted. More recently 
Germany has introduced policies that have cut the pension age to 63, or even 
61 in certain cases, increased minimum wages to relatively high levels, and 
introduced industrial subsidies for green energy producers through the 
Energiewende (Energy change) programme that provides massive subsidies to 
renewable energy producers. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper considers the dependency of economic growth in individual 
European countries on the growth performance of the EU. In this way it 
embeds the analysis of the Western Balkan countries within a wider 
perspective of the European economy as a whole. The analysis is based upon a 
simple Core-Periphery model of the European economy. The paper identifies 
three distinct Peripheries of the EU. An Inner Periphery consists of those 
countries that are in the Eurozone but have suffered a deep recession as a 
result of the Eurozone crisis. An Outer Periphery consists of those countries that 
are within the EU but outside the Eurozone. They have also been drawn into 
the Eurozone crisis as a consequence of spillovers from the crisis. However, 
they have benefited from being within the EU to the extent that their 
economies are supported by large inflows of structural funds. The third is a 
Super Periphery that consists of countries that are outside both the Eurozone 
and the EU, but which are nevertheless tied to the Eurozone through a high 
level of euroisation of their economies. They are consequently unable to use 
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depreciation of their currencies as a means to gain competitive advantage 
without causing large scale bankruptcies by businesses and personal defaults 
by mortgage holders who typically have borrowed either in Euros or in Euro-
indexed local currency loans. 
 
The theory of under-consumption shows how the Core countries are 
vulnerable to secular stagnation and how, in order to overcome this tendency 
within the Eurozone, they are dependent on export revenues achieved by 
trading with the less competitive Periphery countries to sustain their economic 
growth. The import bill that this implies for the Periphery countries (at each 
level) has led to continuous trade and current account deficits and a steady 
build up of debt.  
 
In the 2000s, the process of financialisation stimulated and supported an 
artificial economic boom in the Periphery. Indeed, financialisation was also a 
product of the tendency towards secular stagnation, as the provision of 
consumer credit was an important way in which the Core countries were able 
to stimulate demand and overcome under-consumption tendencies. The 
phenomenon of financialisation has also spread to the peripheries, making 
them vulnerable to the additional financial effects of crisis.  
 
The combination of a theory of Core-Periphery and a theory of under-
consumption provides an explanation of the dependency relationships 
between the European economies and of the spillover effects of Eurozone crisis 
to the Western Balkans. Continuing austerity as a method to create internal 
devaluation in the Periphery is unlikely to succeed as a means to extricate 
these countries from crisis. Due to their lack of competitiveness, a process of 
export led growth is an unlikely outcome. Given the dependencies of the 
European economies upon one another, a possibly better way out of the 
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current period of low growth and stagnation would be a coordinated fiscal 
expansion to stimulate domestic and Europe-wide demand, led by a Europe-
wide investment programme focused on renewing the infrastructure assets in 
the Periphery that could be funded by the European Investment Bank. 
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